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Constitutional Civil Rights
by John Sanchez*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2000 survey period was an active year for constitutional civil
rights litigation in the Eleventh Circuit. All eighteen cases examine
thorny issues arising under the First Amendment. Thirteen cases
address free speech issues while five cases touch on religion. Two cases
deal with zoning ordinances that regulate adult businesses. Two cases
address the constitutionality of zoning ordinances that regulate nude
dancing. Two apply the test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission ("Central Hudson")' for regulating commer-

cial speech. Two cases analyze the law of prior restraints when it comes
to licensing access to traditional public fora. Four cases apply the
balancing test announced in Pickering v. Board of Education2 for

assessing public employee speech. One case involves a citizen's right to
videotape police activity. Turning to the religious clauses of the First
Amendment, three cases involve the Establishment Clause while the
final two cases address free exercise issues.
II.
A.

FIRST AMENDMENT

Free Speech
1. Regulating Adult Businesses.

In Ward v. County of Orange,3

the Eleventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a county's adult
entertainment code.4 The court of appeals concluded that the ordinance
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University. Pomona College (B.A., 1974);
University of California, Berkeley (J.D., 1977); Georgetown University (LL.M., 1984).
1. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
2. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
3. 217 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2000).
4. Id. at 1352.
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was a valid time, place, or manner regulation thereby affirming the
district court's decision that the ordinance was facially constitutional.5
However, the court of appeals remanded the case with instructions that
the district court determine whether the owner's as-applied challenges
were ripe for review.'
In Ward customers at plaintiff's "swimsuit club" can buy "Sweetheart
Party Packages" that give them access to nonalcoholic beverages and
slow dances with performers. Plaintiff had never applied for an adult
entertainment license, and consequently, several performers and a
manager were arrested for violations of the county's Adult Entertainment Code. Plaintiff sued the county, claiming the code was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The district court granted summary
judgment to the county on the facial challenges and concluded that
plaintiff's as-applied challenges were not ripe.7 On appeal the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the zoning ordinance under the "time, place, or manner"
standard spelled out by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc.' Under this standard a zoning ordinance is valid if it is
"designed to serve a substantial government interest and allows for
The Eleventh
reasonable alternative avenues of communication."'
interest
in combating
Circuit concluded that the City had a substantial
the harmful secondary effects of adult businesses, such as crimes, public
health, and safety problems. ' ° The court found in favor of the City and
denied plaintiff's facial challenge even though the City relied on studies
conducted by other cities and did not undertake its own study."
The court also considered which party bore the burden of proving
plaintiff's business was an adult entertainment establishment subject to
licensing.12 Relying on the Supreme Court's rulings in Freedman v.
Maryland 3 and FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,4 the court held that applicants must be protected by two procedural safeguards: (1) Any restraint
prior to judicial review may only be put in place for a short term during
which the status quo must be maintained, and (2) the final judicial
decision must be prompt. 5 However, a city may require the license

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1356.
Id.

Id. at 1352-53.
475 U.S. 41 (1986).
Id. at 50.
217 F.3d at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1354-55.
380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
493 U.S. 215, 227 (1990).
217 F.3d at 1354.
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applicant to bear the burden of proving that it is engaging in protected
activity.1"
Finally, the court addressed whether plaintiff's as-applied challenge
was ripe because plaintiff never applied for a license.1 7 The court ruled
that the ripeness issue turned on whether plaintiff could have secured
from the zoning board a ruling that plaintiff in fact needed a license."l
The court remanded the case to the district court for a determination of
this issue. 9 As for the overbreadth and vagueness challenges, the
court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City
on these claims.
In David Vincent, Inc. v. Broward County,2" the Eleventh Circuit
ruled on whether plaintiffs' former bid for a preliminary injunction of a
licensing ordinance in state court foreclosed them from seeking an
injunction in federal court and whether the zoning ordinance was
constitutional.2 ' The court reversed the district court's ruling that
plaintiffs' failed state court bid barred a later claim for a permanent
injunction and affirmed the lower court's ruling that the ordinance was
constitutional, both facially and as applied.22
In 1993 Broward County, Florida adopted a licensing and zoning
ordinance for adult businesses that substantially reduced the number of
suitable sites in the county for such establishments. Plaintiffs sued in
state court. Subsequently, defendants removed the case to federal court,
but plaintiffs successfully remanded. The state trial court denied (and
the state court of appeals affirmed) plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction, but the trial court never reached the merits of the case nor
the issue of permanent injunction. Plaintiffs then dismissed their state
court claim for a permanent injunction and filed suit in federal court,
challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance and seeking a
permanent injunction. The federal district court granted summary
judgment to the county on the licensing issue based on preclusion
grounds. As for plaintiffs' facial challenge, the district court concentrated on whether the ordinance left a sufficient number of sites for adult
businesses to satisfy the First Amendment's requirement that time,
place, and manner restrictions leave adequate avenues for adult
expression. The district court concluded that seven to nine sites

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1356.
Id.
Id. at 1355-56.
200 F.3d 1325 (lth
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1337.

Cir. 2000).
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available for adult businesses amounted to adequate opportunity for
adult expression in the county.23
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's preclusion ruling,
holding plaintiffs' preliminary injunction proceeding in state court did
not afford them an opportunity to litigate their permanent injunction
claims, as the only issue before the state court was whether plaintiffs
made a case for a preliminary injunction, not whether the county's
ordinance was in fact constitutional. 24 For this reason the circuit court
concluded that neither claim preclusion, issue preclusion, nor notions of
federalism warranted foreclosing plaintiffs' claim for a permanent
injunction of the county's licensing ordinance.2"
The second issue the circuit court addressed was plaintiffs' facial
challenge to the county's ordinance.2" Relying on precedent the court
ruled that the ordinance was constitutional on its face, despite the fact
that the ordinance made no provision for allowing adult businesses with
community approval to locate outside of areas designated for their use
and the fact that geographic and demographic changes in the county left
far fewer potential sites for adult businesses.
In analyzing plaintiffs' as-applied challenge to the ordinance, the
circuit court invoked the secondary effects doctrine, concluding the
ordinance was a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that
should be sustained as long as it is narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest and it allows for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.
In reviewing the district court's
calculation of the number of sites available for adult businesses, the
Eleventh Circuit followed a few general rules: (1) The economic
feasibility of relocating to a site is largely irrelevant; (2) the fact that
some development is needed before a site is suitable for an adult
business does not render it, per se, unavailable; and (3) the First
Amendment does not dwell on restraints that are not imposed by
government itself or by the physical characteristics of the potential
sites.2' Applying these rules the court concluded that the district court
did not err in finding seven to nine sites available for adult use in the
county was a sufficient number.3' Finally, the court turned to whether

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1328-29.
Id. at 1330-32.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1333-37.
Id. at 1333-35.
Id. at 1335.
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seven to nine sites leaves reasonable avenues for communicating the
businesses' protected expression.3 ' Noting that the district court could
have been more specific in defining what factors are relevant in
determining the adequacy of available sites, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded the district court's reasoning was sound. 2
2. Regulating Nude Dancing. In Wise Enterprises,Inc. v. Unified
Government of Athens-Clarke County,"3 the Eleventh Circuit addressed
the constitutionality of a county's adult entertainment ordinance. 4 The
court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment
to the county, concluding (1) that the ordinance was content-neutral,
thus triggering intermediate scrutiny; (2) that the ordinance barring
businesses from serving alcohol and providing adult entertainment at
the same site did not run afoul of the First Amendment; and (3) that the
ordinance's refusal to grant adult entertainment business licenses to
establishments located in the central business district did not violate the
First Amendment.35
Plaintiffs operated adult entertainment establishments featuring nude
barroom dancing while providing alcoholic drinks. After the county
amended its zoning ordinance, barring adult businesses from serving
alcohol, plaintiffs sued the county. 6 On appeal from the district court's
grant of summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the
standard set out by the Supreme Court in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,'7
decided that the district court was correct in adopting the intermediate
scrutiny test for assessing whether the county's ordinances were contentneutral.38 Once again relying on the secondary effects doctrine, the
court concluded that the ordinances were unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. 9 Moreover, the ordinance was narrowly tailored
given that it did not ban all nude dancing, only nude dancing mixed
with alcohol.4" Finally, the court concluded the ordinance provision
that excluded adult businesses from the Central Business District
was
4
also a content-neutral, time, place, and manner regulation. '

31. Id. at 1335-37.

32. Id. at 1336-37.
33.

217 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2000).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1362-65.
Id. at 1362.
529 U.S. 277 (2000).
217 F.3d at 1363-64.
Id.at 1364.
Id. at 1365.
Id.
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In Artistic Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Warner Robins,42 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a city's adult business
ordinance and its alcoholic beverage ordinance.43 While affirming the
district court's ruling that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally
vague, the court reversed the district court's conclusion that the
ordinance did not amount to a prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment."
4
The Eleventh Circuit adopted the test in United States v. O'Brien 1
to assess the government's regulation of adult entertainment. 4 Relying
on circuit precedent, the court ruled that a prohibition on the sale of
Turning to the
alcohol at adult businesses is content-neutral. 7
"secondary effects" prong, the court concluded the city council had
sufficient evidence for finding that banning the sale and consumption of
alcohol by adult businesses would curb crime and other social ills
associated with adult businesses.48
Plaintiffs claimed the ordinance's exemption for mainstream or
traditional theaters was unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, plaintiffs
contended the ordinance's percentile standard, under which businesses
must secure a license if more than twenty percent of their performances
feature specified sexual content, was vague.4 ' The court determined
the exemption's "80/20" standard afforded sufficient notice to business
owners and served as an adequate restraint on arbitrary enforcement."
Finally, the court addressed whether the ordinance amounted to a
prior restraint on expression because it did not specify an adequate time
limit for the city's review of license applications. 5 ' Again relying on
circuit precedent, the court concluded the ordinance did amount to a
prior restraint because it was silent on the applicant's right to begin
running his business if the city fails to act on his application. 2 In light
of this failure to guarantee an adult business owner the right to begin
expressive activities within a brief, fixed time frame, the ordinance was
facially violative of the First Amendment. 3

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

223 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1311.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
223 F.3d at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309.

Id.
Id. at 1309-10.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1310-11.

Id.
Id. at 1311.
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3. Regulating Commercial Speech. In Mason v. Florida Bar,54
the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the Florida State
Bar's rule barring self-laudatory advertisements, as applied to an
attorney who was forced to include a disclaimer when he advertised.
The disclaimer was intended to alert readers that he had earned the
highest rating from a national legal directory." The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the rule barring self-laudatory
advertisements was not unconstitutionally vague; however, it reversed
the district court's conclusion that the required disclaimer was constitutional."6
Plaintiff, a criminal defense attorney, asked for an ethics advisory
opinion about his yellow pages advertisement that asserts that he is
"'AV' Rated, the Highest Rating Martindale-Hubbell National Law
Directory." 7 The Florida Bar's opinion was that the advertisement
violated a state bar rule against self-laudatory statements unless the ad
included a "full explanation as to the meaning of the [MartindaleHubbell] AV rating and how the publication chooses the participating
attorneys."58 Moreover, the disclaimer must warn "that the ratings and
participation are based 'exclusively on ... opinions expressed by ...
confidential sources' and that these publications do not undertake to rate
all Florida attorneys."5 9 Plaintiff sued alleging that the Bar's opinion
violated the First Amendment and that Rule 4-7.2(j) 6 1 was void for
vagueness under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court found in favor of the Bar and sustained
Rule 4-7.2(j) against plaintiff's constitutional challenges.6 '
The Eleventh Circuit relied upon the four-part test for assessing
government regulation of commercial speech originally framed by the
Supreme Court in Central Hudson.6 2 Under this test a state may
regulate commercial speech that is not false, deceptive, or misleading
only if the regulation "directly and materially advances a substantial
state interest in a manner no more extensive than necessary to serve
that interest."63 Conceding that plaintiff's advertisement was truthful,

54.
55.

208 F.3d 952 (llth Cir. 2000).
Id. at 954.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 959.
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id.
24 FLA. L. WEEKLY 598-99 (1999).
208 F.3d at 954-55.

62. Id. at 955-56.
63. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1994).
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the court turned to the second prong, whether the state's interests in
limiting the speech are substantial.64 The Bar asserted three interests
as substantial government interests: (1) an interest in ensuring that
attorney advertisements are not misleading; (2) an interest in furthering
the public's access to useful information to aid them in evaluating
attorneys; and (3) an interest in encouraging attorney rating services to
use objective criteria.66
While the court concluded the first two
interests were substantial, it failed to see the value in the distinction
drawn by the third interest between objective and subjective criteria, so
it rejected the Bar's third asserted substantial interest.6 Turning to
the third prong, whether the state's regulation mitigates the asserted
harm in a direct and effective manner, the court concluded the Bar is not
relieved of its burden to identify a genuine threat of danger merely
because it requires a disclaimer rather than a total ban on plaintiff's
speech. 7 In light of this glaring omission in the record of an identifiable harm, the regulation flunked the third prong of Central Hudson,
and the court saw no reason to address the final prong.6"
Plaintiff also claimed the term "self-laudatory" contained in Rule 47.2(j) is unconstitutionally vague.69 While the court granted the rule
was somewhat ambiguous, it affirmed that part of the district court's
judgment on the void-for-vagueness challenge, concluding that "the
Rule's language is plain and would adequately put Bar members on
notice that merely self-referential and laudatory statements or statements describing the quality of their legal services are prohibited."7"
In Jim Gall Auctioneers, Inc. v. City of Coral Gables,7 the Eleventh
Circuit addressed a constitutional challenge to a city's ban on commercial auctions and their advertising in residential areas.72 The court
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City,
determining the City's ban on commercial auctions and their advertising
in residential areas did not infringe on plaintiff's commercial speech
rights under the First Amendment.7"
Plaintiff is a for-profit corporation that auctions real and personal
property in Florida. After a large three-day auction held at a private

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

208 F.3d at 956.
Id. at 955-56.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 956-58.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 959.
210 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1333-34.
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residence, the City issued three citations to plaintiff for "conducting
business from a residence" in violation of a city zoning regulation that
bars nonresidential use. Moreover, the City issued four citations to
plaintiff for "advertising in a residential area" in violation of the zoning
code. While suit was initially brought in state court, it was later
removed to federal court, which ruled in favor of the City, concluding the
City's ban on commercial auctions in residential areas was narrowly
tailored to achieve the City's substantial interest in promoting neighborhood aesthetics and tranquility.74
The Eleventh Circuit, while conceding plaintiff's advertising was
clearly commercial speech, said it was arguable whether conducting an
auction was also considered commercial speech or merely commercial
activity subject to time, place, and manner analysis."' In the end it did
not matter because even assuming both were commercial speech, the
regulation satisfied the Central Hudson test for assessing the validity of
government regulation of commercial speech.76 Agreeing with the
district court that the City has a substantial interest in maintaining the
aesthetics and tranquility of its residential neighborhoods, the court also
agreed with the lower court that the regulation was narrowly tailored to
achieve those goals.77
4. Regulating Speech on Traditional Public Fora. In Cannabis
8
Action Network, Inc. v. City of Gainesville,"
the Eleventh Circuit
addressed whether a city's sound ordinance and its amended version of
its street-closing ordinance amounted to prior restraints in violation of
the First Amendment.7" Affirming in part and reversing in part, the
circuit court ruled (1) that the district court's decision to grant an
extension of the deadline for filing a notice of appeal was not an abuse
of its discretion; (2) that the sound ordinance did amount to a prior
restraint on speech; (3) that the sound ordinance was facially unconstitutional given its failure to pin down any time within which the city
manager had to grant or deny a sound amplification permit; and (4) that
the street closing ordinance was also unconstitutional on its face because
the City bore no burden of initiating judicial proceedings."0

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1331-32.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id. at 1333.
231 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 763-66.
Id. at 766-76.
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Plaintiff, a group of political activists who challenge laws against the
possession and distribution of marijuana, often held political rallies in
public parks. Plaintiff applied for permits from the City in preparation
for its annual rally. After the city manager denied the permit requests,
plaintiff sued in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The district court enjoined the City from enforcing one of its
permit laws, concluding there was a substantial likelihood that the law
violated the First Amendment. Ultimately, the court ordered the City
to issue all three permits sought by plaintiff.8 '
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the
district court abused its discretion in granting plaintiff an extension to
file a notice of appeal; and (2) whether the City's sound ordinance and
street-closing ordinance amount to prior restraints on free speech on the
ground that they do not include procedural safeguards. 2 In reviewing
the appeal extension issue, the court applied a four-factor test"" set out
by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick
Associates, LP:84 Courts should "tak[e] account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," including "the danger of
prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length of the delay and its potential
impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether
the movant acted in good faith."" Applying these factors the circuit
court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting
plaintiff an appeal extension.8 6
After ruling that it had jurisdiction over this case, the Eleventh
Circuit turned to plaintiff's substantive appeal.8 7 First, the court
assumed the City's street-closing ordinance was a prior restraint because
both parties, as well as the district court, assumed that it was.88
Second, the court examined whether the City's restriction on the use of
amplified sound amounts to a prior restraint on speech.89 Finally, the
court reviewed both ordinances and considered whether they afforded
procedural safeguards required of prior restraints on speech.9"

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 763-66.
Id. at 766-71.
Id. at 766-67.
507 U.S. 380 (1993).
231 F.3d at 767 (quoting Pioneer,507 U.S. at 395).
Id.
Id. at 767-68.
Id. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 771.
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In examining plaintiff's facial challenge to the sound ordinance, the
court considered whether the ordinance vested unfettered discretion in
a government agent to decide whether to grant or deny expressive
conduct.9 1 While the district court relied on Ward v. Rock Against
Racism,92 which held that ensuring proper sound quality, balanced with
respect for residential neighbors, is not a prior restraint, the Eleventh
Circuit stressed the difference between this case and Ward. 93 Unlike
Ward, the court insisted, this case encompassed not only the right to
limit and control noise level and mix of sound, but the power of the City
to deny sound amplification altogether.9 4
Relying on the closely
analogous Supreme Court case of Saia v. New York, 9' the court of
appeals concluded the district court erred in finding the sound ordinance
was not open to facial challenge.9" Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit
found the sound ordinance was a prior restraint that must afford
procedural safeguards.9 7
Freedman v. Maryland" framed three procedural safeguards: (1) If
a permit is denied, the censor bears the burden of triggering judicial
proceedings, as well as the burden of proof at trial; (2) any censorship
prior to court review may be imposed only for a short, set time frame
during which the status quo is preserved; and (3) there must be the
guarantee of quick judicial review in case the permit is wrongly
refused.99 The court then assessed each ordinance for evidence of at
least two, if not three of the Freedman procedural safeguards.0 ° Even
a quick scan of the sound ordinance revealed omission of the second
Freedman standard: No time limit was set on when the city manager
must grant or deny a sound amplification permit.'
As this safeguard
is essential, the court concluded the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the City must be reversed."'
Turning to the street-closing ordinance, as amended, both parties
agreed it satisfied the second Freedman standard. "' As for the other

91.
92.
93,
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 771-72.
491 U.S. 781 (1989).
231 F.3d at 769-70.
Id. at 770.
334 U.S. 558 (1948).
231 F.3d at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
231 F.3d at 772.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 773.
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essential standard, the assurance of "prompt judicial review," the
Eleventh Circuit noted wide disagreement among courts over the
meaning of this phrase."' The court left this standard unresolved in
light of its ruling on the first Freedman prong, the burden-shifting
procedural safeguard."' The court supported its conclusion that this
safeguard was essential in this case because the noncommercial plaintiff
lacks the business incentive to go to court and because the speech at
issue is core political speech in a public forum.'
In light of the
ordinance's failure to assure the City would satisfy its burden of
initiating court proceedings, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the first
Freedman standard was lacking.0 7 Absent this safeguard, the ordinance amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech.'
For this reason, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the City on the street-closing ordinance."'0
In United States v. Frandsen,"" the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the
convictions of protestors arrested for demonstrating at a national park
without a permit."' The circuit court reversed the district court's
decision upholding defendants' convictions, concluding (1) that a facial
challenge to some parts of the federal regulation was permissible,
without insisting defendants prove that under no circumstances could
the law be valid and (2) that the federal regulation requiring persons to
secure a permit before demonstrating in a national park amounted to an
unconstitutional prior restraint, in light
of its failure to impose any real
2
time limits on the decision maker."
Defendants, advocates of a "clothing optional" lifestyle, were arrested
for publicly assembling at a federal park without a permit in violation
of federal law. Defendants raised a facial challenge against both the
regulation requiring them to secure a permit before protesting and the
regulation banning protesting without a permit. The magistrate judge
ruled the park was not a public forum on the ground that the government had designated it for recreation. Therefore, the judge adopted a
reasonableness standard under which one of the regulations was
sustained. On appeal the federal district court upheld the convictions.
Neither the magistrate judge nor the district court addressed the

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 773-74.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 774-75.
Id.
Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 776.
212 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1233.
Id. at 1236, 1240.
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constitutionality of the regulation barring protesting without a
permit."".
The Eleventh Circuit addressed whether defendants' convictions
should be overturned on three grounds: (1) that the regulation lacked
the Freedmanprocedural safeguards; (2) that the regulation is overbroad
and not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest; and
(3) that the regulation leaves unfettered discretion in the hands of the
park superintendent in weighing whether to issue a permit.14 The
court found it necessary to address only the first issue."1 '
As a threshold matter, the court had to decide whether defendants'
facial challenge was cognizable. Invoking circuit precedent, the court
clearly stated that for "[a] facial challenge to be successful, [a plaintiff]
'must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law]
would be valid.'""' 6 However, this rule does not apply if the regulation
amounts to a prior restraint."' After a review of conflicting case law,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded facial challenges to prior restraints on
speech are actionable "without requiring the plaintiff to show that there
are no conceivable set of facts where the application of the particular
government regulation might or would be constitutional." 8
In determining the proper standard of judicial review for this
particular prior restraint, the court had to decide whether the site of
defendants' protest, a national park, was a traditional, limited, or
nonpublic forum."' Reversing the district court's decision, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that national parks are traditional public fora,
triggering strict scrutiny.' ° In this kind of public fora, the government is entitled to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression as
long as the restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternaMoreover, regulations must
tive channels of communication."' 2'
conform to the Freedman safeguards. 2 Because the court found the
regulation lacked one of those procedural safeguards, the court did not
resolve whether the regulation was a permissible time, place, or manner

113. Id. at 1234.
114. Id. at 1234-35.
115. Id. at 1235.
116. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1083-84 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
117. 212 F.3d at 1236.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1237-38.
Id. at 1238 (quoting United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)).
Id.
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restriction. 123 The court found the regulation failed to place any
specific time limits on the decision maker.'2 4 Although the regulation
required the superintendent to grant a permit "without unreasonable
delay," it did not afford any guidance on what qualified as "unreasonable." Under this regulation speech could be silenced by inaction.
Therefore, the regulation2 was unconstitutional, and the court reversed
defendants' convictions.1 1
5. Public Employee Speech. In Stanley v. City of Dalton,126 the
Eleventh Circuit employed the Pickering balancing test to decide
whether a public employee, who was terminated in part in retaliation for
exercising his First Amendment rights and in part for a lawful motive,
had proved his case. 127 Reversing the district court, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled that the public employer was entitled to qualified
immunity when the record clearly established the employer in fact was
motivated, at least in part, by lawful considerations. Therefore, the
for the
court remanded the case to the district court to enter 1judgment
28
claims.
Amendment
First
employee's
the
employer on
Plaintiff, a police officer, accused the police chief of having stolen
money from the evidence room. Plaintiff alleged he was retaliated
against for speaking his mind. After the district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the
case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 129 The court set out the
four parts of the test for weighing First Amendment retaliation claims:
(1) whether the public employee's speech touched on a matter of public
concern; (2) if so, whether the employee's First Amendment right
outweighed the employer's interest in running a public workplace; (3)
whether the employee's speech played a substantial part in the
employer's decision to discipline the employee; and (4) if the employee
establishes the preceding factors, whether the employer proved by a
the same
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
130
conduct.
protected
the
of
absence
the
in
even
decision
The Eleventh Circuit determined that plaintiff's speech touched on a
matter of public concern and applied the following factors in deciding
whether plaintiff's speech outweighed defendant's right to run the public
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128.
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workplace: (1) whether the speech impedes the government's ability to
perform its duties efficiently; (2) the manner, time, and place of the
speech; and (3) the context within which the speech occurred.13 1 The
court concluded the Pickering balancing test tipped in plaintiff's favor
because, even though unfounded accusations against superiors can be
disruptive, plaintiff had some factual basis for telling state authorities
that he suspected a supervisor of theft. 132 As for the third prong of the
test, the circuit court concluded the district court had correctly found
that plaintiff's evidence created a jury question as to whether his
protected speech was a substantial factor in defendant's employment
decision.' 3 3
The Eleventh Circuit was most attentive to the "but for" in the fourth
The court made
prong of the First Amendment retaliation test.'
clear it was error for the district court to conclude summarily that a
finding in plaintiff's favor on the third prong compelled a finding in his
favor on the fourth prong as well.3 5 Referring to the fourth prong as
an affirmative defense, the court found that while defendant had shown
adequate evidence to make the fourth prong a jury issue, his evidence
136
was not strong enough to warrant judgment as a matter of law.
While deception alone may amount to an adequate basis for discharging
plaintiff, the court stopped short of saying that as a matter of law
defendant necessarily would have done so absent plaintiff's accusing him
of theft.' 7 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit concluded defendant
was entitled to qualified immunity because defendant's dismissal of
Moreover, circuit precedent tilts
plaintiff was objectively reasonable.'
strongly in favor of immunity: "[Only in the rarest of cases will
reasonable government officials truly know that the termination or
discipline of a public employee violate[s] 'clearly established' federal
rights."'3 9 The case was reversed and remanded to the district court
to enter judgment for defendant on plaintiff's First Amendment
claims. 4 °
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Similarly, in Maggio v. Sipple,'4 the Eleventh Circuit ruled the
public employer was entitled to qualified immunity on the public
employee's Section 1983 claim, alleging her employer retaliated against
her for exercising her First Amendment rights. 142 Reversing the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit ruled the public employer was
entitled to qualified immunity when the employee
has failed to allege
1 4
the violation of a clearly established right. 1
Plaintiff alleged defendant retaliated against her after she testified on
behalf of her supervisor at a grievance hearing. 144 Applying the fourpart First Amendment retaliation test, the Eleventh Circuit addressed
whether plaintiff's speech touched on a matter of public concern. 14 5
After examining the content, form, and context of plaintiff's speech, the
court concluded it was not of public concern. 146 Plaintiff's speech, in
essence, took the form of a private employee grievance. Moreover,
plaintiff disclosed her concerns to official administrative bodies but not
to the public. Supporting her supervisor would curry the favor of
plaintiff's supervisor or improve the conditions of her employment and
thus further her own personal interest. The fact that plaintiff was
testifying in another employee's grievance proceeding, rather than
pursuing her own grievance, does not per se prove plaintiff's speech
touched on a matter of public concern.147 But even assuming plaintiff
had shown a First Amendment violation, the court concluded, the
individual defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity because
the four-prong test is so fact specific that, without clear, bright-line
rules, a defendant will only rarely be on notice that his behavior was
unlawful. 4 ' The court reversed, vacated, and remanded the case to
the district court with orders to dismiss.'49
In Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,' the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed the dismissal of a city's affirmative action specialist who
alleged in part that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her
First Amendment rights.'' The court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to the City, concluding in part that
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plaintiff's dismissal due to her refusal to modify a personal commentary
that she incorporated into her affirmative action report to the city
council did not amount
to a violation of her free speech rights under the
5 2
First Amendment.
Plaintiff's superiors had grave reservations about some of the personal
commentary contained in her official report because it was critical of the
City's affirmative action efforts. When asked to make changes before the
report was distributed to the city commission, plaintiff refused and was
dismissed after having an opportunity to be heard.5 3 Applying the
four-part First Amendment retaliation test, the Eleventh Circuit
assumed that plaintiff's speech touched on a matter of public concern but
concluded that her First Amendment right was outweighed in the second
part of the test by the City's interests." 4 The court made clear that
the "burden of caution employees bear regarding speech vary with the
extent of authority and/or public accountability that employee's role entails."'5 5 Here, the city's interest in shaping an official document that
was consistent with the city's expectations took precedence. ' While
plaintiff may have seen herself as a crusader for her personal vision of
social justice, her refusal to change the report amounted to insubordination."' In the court's view, plaintiff was not entitled to refuse to
perform a lawful task well within the scope of her duties.'," In effect
plaintiff had tried to control the content of her employer's speech. '9
Because plaintiff's case failed the second prong of the test, the court
concluded
plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim had no
160
merit.
In Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham,' the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the propriety of a jury award of damages and injunctive relief to
police officers who alleged they had been discriminated against for
exercising their First Amendment rights."' Reversing the district
court's order granting Sergeant Oladeinde's motion for injunctive relief
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and ordering the city to promote her, the circuit court concluded63 that
plaintiff's speech was not protected under the First Amendment.
Plaintiff blew the whistle on police officers suspected of tampering
with jail records involving the arrest of the mayor's daughter. Later,
plaintiff was denied a promotion. For this reason and others, plaintiff
accused defendant of retaliation."' In applying the, four-part First
Amendment retaliation test, the Eleventh Circuit concluded it was
clearly a matter of public concern that a police chief and members of his
department would tamper with public records to cover up the criminal
conduct of a family member of the highest elected official of a city.'
Turning to the second prong of the test, the court stressed the "'special
concerns of quasi-military organizations such as police departments. '""' These entities have a "heightened need for order, loyalty,
morale and harmony." "7 Therefore, there is a stronger governmental
interest in regulating the speech of police officers than for other public
employees.'
Here, plaintiff's speech was disruptive to the efficient
operation of the department. 69 For this reason, defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. 70 Local government
is only liable if constitutional torts result from an official government
policy, the acts of an official fairly deemed to represent government
policy, or a custom or practice so entrenched and clearcut that it
assumes the force of law. 7' Because plaintiff's claim failed, the
district court erred in granting plaintiff injunctive relief. 7 '
6. Right to Gather Information. In Smith v. City of Cum7 the Eleventh Circuit reviewed claims that a city's police force
ming,"'
had harassed plaintiffs and that one of the plaintiffs had been prevented
from videotaping police behavior in violation of the First Amend7 4 In affirming the district court's grant of
ment."
summary judgment
to the City and its police chief, the circuit court concluded that while
plaintiffs enjoyed a First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time,
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manner, and place limits, to videotape police activity, plaintiffs fell short
of establishing
that they were in fact prevented from exercising that
75
right.'

While the district court had ruled that no First Amendment right was
involved by the facts in this case, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that
the First Amendment protects the right to gather information about
what public officials do on public property and to record matters of
public interest.' 76 Although the district court erred in its finding that
no First Amendment issue was involved, the circuit court nevertheless
affirmed the lower court's ruling because plaintiffs had not shown that
defendants' acts violated
their First Amendment right to record matters
77
of public interest.1

B.

Freedom of Religion

1. Non-Establishment Clause. In Chandler v. Siegelman,'T8 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the constitutionality of an Alabama statute
allowing nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated prayer at
school-related events.'7 9 In reversing the district court's issuance of a
permanent injunction against the statute's enforcement, the circuit court
concluded (1) that the injunction that barred the school district from
allowing any prayer in a public setting at any school event was
overbroad and (2) that the school district may not ban truly studentinitiated religious speech, nor impose time, place, and manner restrictions on that speech that surpass those put on students' secular
speech. 0
Before ruling on this case, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe ("Santa Fe"),' condemning student-led invocations on school property at school-sponsored,
school-related events.' 2 The Supreme Court then remanded this case
to the Eleventh Circuit for further consideration in light of Santa Fe. '
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this case was not in
conflict with the ruling in Santa Fe and took pains to explain how this

175. Id. at 1333.
176. Id.
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178. 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000).
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181. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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case can be squared with Santa Fe so that the district court had some
guidance when it refrained its injunction. ' 4
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by pointing out that Santa Fe
did not eliminate the distinction between state speech and private
speech in a public school setting: There is still room for some religious
'
speech even in public schools after Santa Fe.18
Remove the school
sponsorship, and the prayer is private.' 6 "So long as the prayer is
genuinely student-initiated, and not the product of any school policy
which actively or surreptitiously encourages it, the speech is private and
it is protected[J"'8
The Establishment Clause permits a policy that

tolerates religion as long as it does not endorse it.'
In reviewing the language of the permanent injunction issued by the
district court, the Eleventh Circuit made clear that it may "neither
prohibit genuinely student-initiated religious speech, nor apply
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of that speech which exceed
those placed on students' secular speech."' 9 The court remanded the
case to the district court in order for it to reframe its permanent
injunction.' 90
In Adler v. Duval County School Board,'9 the Eleventh Circuit twice
reviewed whether a school district's policy of allowing graduating
students to vote on whether to conduct unfettered student-led messages
at graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.'92 In the first decision, the court reversed the district
court's conclusion that the practice did not violate the Establishment
Clause.'93 However, upon rehearing the case en banc, the court
affirmed the district court, concluding that the policy did not violate the
Establishment Clause.'9 4 This decision was issued before the Supreme
Court handed down its ruling in Santa Fe, a case that goes to the heart
9
of the issue in Adler.' 1
The Duval County school system had a longstanding policy of
permitting a graduating student, elected by classmates, to deliver an
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unfettered message of his or her choice at the beginning and/or closing
of graduation ceremonies.'9 6 In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled in Lee
v. Weisman'9 7 that a school board policy of inviting a minister, rabbi,
or member of the clergy to deliver a nonsectarian prayer at graduation
violated the Establishment Clause.'"8 Later, in response to letters
from students and members of the community, the Duval County
superintendent considered allowing student-initiated, student-led prayer
during the graduation ceremony. Under this revised policy, student
speakers delivered some form of religious message at ten of seventeen
high school graduation ceremonies. In response, several Duval County
public school students sued the school system alleging that even studentinitiated and student-led prayer amounted to a violation of the
Establishment Clause and of the Free Exercise Clause. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the school system.'
On
appeal the Eleventh Circuit concluded the case was moot given that the
students had all graduated."'
In May 1998 plaintiffs filed this case against the school system,
essentially alleging the same constitutional violations. Again, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
board." ' The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's judgment
and remanded for further proceedings. 0 2 On June 3, 1999, the circuit
court vacated this ruling and granted rehearing en banc. °3
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion began by admitting that separating
private student prayer from state-sponsored prayer is a difficult
task.20 4 As an aid in this line-drawing, the court relied upon both
Lemon v. Kurtzman2 ' and Lee. The court distinguished Duval County's practice from the one in Lee in that in the former neither the school
system nor its agents "may ordain, direct, establish, or endorse a
religious prayer or message of any kind."2 6 Moreover, not only is
Duval County's policy content-neutral, but it may even be constitutionally required by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
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Amendment." 7 In support of its views, the court cited the Equal
Access Act,2"' a federal law that bars public secondary schools that
receive federal funds from denying student access to school premises on
grounds of the religious content of their speech." 9 Furthermore, in
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette," ° the Supreme
Court ruled that admission of private religious groups in open forums
under neutral selection criteria does not amount to state sponsorship of
religion.2 1' Government neutrality, the circuit court insisted, is all the
Establishment Clause requires with regard to religion.2" 2
The Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim that the school board's
majoritarian process of choosing a speaker veils the otherwise private
speech of a student with the stamp of the state."' This proposition of
the Eleventh Circuit stands on shaky grounds in light of the Supreme
Court's later ruling in Santa Fe. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected
plaintiffs' coercion argument, concluding that "neither the Duval County
schools nor the graduating senior classes even decide if a religious
prayer or message will be delivered, let alone 'require' or 'coerce' the
student audience to participate in any privately-crafted message." 4
Turning to the Lemon test, the Eleventh Circuit addressed three
questions: (1) whether the policy has a secular purpose; (2) whether the
primary effect of the policy is to advance or inhibit religion; and (3)
whether the policy promotes an excessive government entanglement with
religion.215 The court, after exhaustive analysis, concluded the school
board's policy passed constitutional muster under Lemon's three prongs
and affirmed the judgment of the district court."1
In Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc.,217 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed whether either the Free Exercise or
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment protected a church from
being sued for employment discrimination by its clergy.218 In affirming

207. Id. at 1077-78.
208. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994).
209. Id. § 4071(a).
210. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
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212. 206 F.3d at 1078.
213. Id. at 1080.
214. Id. at 1083.
215. Id. at 1084 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13).
216. Id. at 1090-91. Two judges dissented, asserting that while Lee and Lemon govern
this case, the majority's application of the principles enshrined in those cases was
misguided. Id. at 1091-1106 (Kravitch & Barkett, JJ., dissenting).
217. 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000).
218. Id. at 1300-01.
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the district court, the circuit court concluded that the ministerial
exception prevented plaintiff from suing his former church employer.219
Plaintiff, an ordained minister of the Christian Methodist Episcopal
Church, aided another minister in preparing an official complaint of
sexual harassment by a superior to the church elders. In response,
plaintiff was reassigned to a distant church at a lower salary. Rather
than complying, plaintiff resigned and brought this claim, alleging
retaliatory and constructive discharge. The district court granted the
church's summary judgment, and plaintiff appealed.2 °
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by reiterating that Title VII,
the federal law banning employment discrimination, does not govern the
employment relationship between a church and its ministers (known as
the ministerial exception).22' The question for the court, however, was
whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 2 that religious beliefs do not
excuse obedience to a law of general application, had eroded the
ministerial exception to the point that the First Amendment does not bar
application of Title VII, a neutral law of general application, to the
church-minister employment relationship even if doing so burdens the
free exercise of religion.22 '
Agreeing with sister circuit caselaw
concluding that the ministerial exception to Title VII survives Smith, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Smith addressed only one type of
government infringement on free exercise-an individual's ability to
practice his or her religious beliefs. 224 The Court in Smith did not
address the type of free exercise infringement under review
here-meddling with a church's ability to choose and control its own
clergy.225 Moreover, because the ministerial exception does not rely on
strict scrutiny, the Court's rejection in Smith of heightened scrutiny does
not undercut the ministerial exception either.2
Invoking the third
prong of the Lemon test, the circuit court buttressed its conclusion by
making clear that regulating the relationship between a church and its
clergy would amount to excessive government entanglement with
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.227
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2. Free Exercise Clause. In Hakim v. Hicks,228 the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed whether a Florida state prison policy of refusing to
allow Muslim inmates who had legally changed their names to be
identified by both names violated their free exercise rights under the
First Amendment.229 In affirming the district court's ruling ordering
the state prison to recognize the dual names of Muslim inmates on their
prison identification cards, the court concluded (1) that the prison's
policy violated the Muslim inmates' free exercise rights and (2) that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in turning down the prison's
motion for relief from its judgment."'
While in prison plaintiff converted to Islam and legally changed his
name to Rasikh Abdul Hakim. He sought to force the prison to follow
a dual-name policy on incoming and outgoing mail, on his prisoner
identification card, and on those prison services secured by using the
card. 31
Compliance with plaintiff's requests, the prison argued,
required "'a laborious process to obtain notary services in
a legal name
2 2
without possessing an identification card in that name.'
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit began by addressing the proper
standard of judicial review to apply to free exercise claims. 2" Relying
on Supreme Court precedent, the court invoked a deferential standard
for assessing whether a prison regulation violates an inmate's free
exercise rights. :4 Under this standard any infringement is actionable
only if the regulation is unreasonable..2
Reviewing other federal cases
on the subject, the court concluded that the weight of authority limits
the scope of inmates' free exercise rights to use religious names in
prison.2 3 6 For this reason, the Eleventh Circuit concluded the district
court did not err in ruling that the prison's policy was unreasonable.2 7
Under this ruling the prison was ordered to put in place a dual-name
policy by "adding a legal (statutory) religious name, through an 'a/k/a'
designation, to an inmate's identification card" after notice and proof of
the name change.238
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In response to this order, the prison placed a label on the reverse side
of plaintiff's identification card, claiming that the front of the identification card lacked space for both names. The district court ruled that this
On appeal the
solution did not comply with the court's order. 9
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court, concluding that the prison's
policy of placing a second name on the reverse side of the identification
card was reasonable, but the court directed the prison to permit plaintiff
to obtain all related prison services under the dual-name policy.240 In
a concurring opinion, one judge asserted that placing plaintiff's religious
name on the back of the identification card violated his free exercise
rights.24 '
In Gibson v. Babbitt,242 the Eleventh Circuit took up the question
whether a federal agency's denial of five bald or golden eagle feathers to
a Native American who was not a member of a federally recognized
Indian tribe was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.243 Affirming
the district court, the circuit court ruled that confining the religious use
exemption under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act 244 to
Indians who belonged to federally recognized tribes did not amount to
either a constitutional or statutory free exercise violation.249
Plaintiff applied to the federal Fish and Wildlife Service for five bald
or golden eagle feathers for use in religious rituals. The agency denied
this request on grounds that plaintiff did not belong to a federally
recognized Indian tribe and so did not qualify for the feathers under the
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act. Plaintiff sued alleging violations
of the Free Exercise Clause and of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA"). 246 The district court denied plaintiff's claims under
RFRA and did not address his free exercise claim.247
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit invoked strict scrutiny as the proper
standard for assessing violations of RFRA. 248 Under strict scrutiny the
burden is on the government to produce compelling reasons for its
action.249 The Government argued three compelling interests: (1) the
preservation of two endangered species of eagles; (2) the preservation of
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Native American religions; and (3) the duty owed by the federal
government to fulfill treaty commitments to federally recognized Indian
tribes.2" Affirming the district court, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
the Government had mct its burden under RFRA of establishing at least
one compelling government interest for its action (fulfilling its treaty
obligations with federally recognized Indian tribes).2" 1 The court then
turned to the question of whether the regulation was the least restrictive
means of furthering the government's treaty obligations with the
federally recognized Indian tribes.252 In recognition of the limited
supply of bald and golden eagle feathers and the sizeable pool of
individuals who might otherwise qualify, the court of appeals agreed
with the district court that the regulation was the least restrictive
means of furthering the compelling governmental interest." ' Applying
the same test to plaintiff's free exercise claim, the court denied plaintiff's
constitutional claim as well. 4
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